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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Chase Dalton Gillespie appeals from his convictions for possession of sexually
exploitative materials in Docket No. 39427 and from the district court's order revoking
his withheld judgment and probation in Docket No. 39426. 1

Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
In 2008, in Docket No. 39426, the state charged Gillespie with possession of
sexually exploitative material.

(39426 R., pp.92-93.) Pursuant to a plea agreement,

Gillespie pleaded guilty. (39426 R., pp.105-08, 113-15.) The district court entered an
order withholding judgment and placed Gillespie on probation for five years. (39426 R.,
pp.129-34, 138.) The state subsequently alleged that Gillespie violated his probation by
viewing pornography and engaging in a sexual relationship with another probationer.
(39426 R., pp.151-52.) Ultimately, Gillespie admitted the violations. (39426 R., p.163.)
Investigation of the probation violations also resulted in a separate criminal
prosecution for possession of sexually exploitative materials. In Docket No. 39427, the
state charged Gillespie with two counts of possession of sexually exploitative material.
(39427 R., pp.9-10.) Gillespie waived his right to a jury trial and requested a bench trial.
(39427 R., p.11.) The parties stipulated that Gillespie possessed a thumb drive which
contained multiple sexually exploitative images and videos. (39427 R., pp.12-13.) The
parties also stipulated that there were "only three questions before the court[:] (1)
whether Gillespie possessed the images/videos, knowingly and willfully[;] (2) whether

1

On February 28, 2012, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order consolidating
Docket Nos. 39426 and 39427 for purposes of this appeal.
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possessing multiple images and videos on a single digital device is a single possession
or whether each image or video may be prosecuted individually[; and] (3) [d]o the
images meet the definition of Idaho Code[§] 18-1507(2)(k)." (39427 R., p.13 (emphasis
original).)
At the close of the bench trial, the district court found that Gillespie possessed
the images knowingly and willfully, but asked the parties to brief the second and third
issues.

(Tr., p.263, L.21 - p.264, L.3; p.269, L.3 - p.271, L.24.) Subsequently, the

district court determined that sexually exploitative images housed on a thumb drive
were encompassed within the definition of Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)(k), and that,
because there were multiple images of multiple victims, each image or video could be
prosecuted individually without violating Gillespie's right to be free from double
jeopardy. (39427 R., pp.32-41.)
In Docket No. 39427, the district court entered judgment against Gillespie and
imposed consecutive unified sentences of ten years with three years fixed on each
count of possession of sexually exploitative material. (39427 R., pp.54-56.) In Docket
No. 39426, the district court revoked Gillespie's withheld judgment and probation, and
sentenced him to ten years with two years fixed, to run consecutive to his sentences in
Docket No. 39427.

(39426 R., pp.179-80.)

(39426 R., pp.185-86; 39427 R., pp.64-65.)

2

Gillespie filed timely notices of appeal.

ISSUES
Gillespie states the issues on appeal as:
1.
Did the district court err in 39427 when the court determined that
the thumb drive in Mr. Gillespie's possession fell within the definition of
"sexually exploitative material" under the versions of l.C. § 18-1507 and
l.C. § 18-1507A that were in effect at the time of Mr. Gillespie's alleged
offenses?
2.
Did the district court err in 39427, and violate Mr. Gillespie's
constitutional right against double jeopardy, when the court entered two
convictions of possession of sexually exploitative material for a noncommercial purpose when Mr. Gillespie possessed a single thumb drive
that contained multiple images?
3.
Did the district court err in 39426 when the court revoked Mr.
Gillespie's probation and executed a sentence of ten years, with two years
fixed?
4.
Did the district court impose excessive sentences, and thereby
abuse its discretion, when the court sentenced Mr. Gillespie to ten years,
with three years fixed, for each count of possession of sexually
exploitative material in 39427; with these sentences to be served
consecutively to each other and to Mr. Gillespie's sentence in 39426?
(Appellant's brief, p.14.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Gillespie failed to show error in the district court's legal determination that
images of sexually exploitative material housed on a thumb drive were encompassed
within the definition of Idaho Code § 18-1507(2)(k)?
2.
Has Gillespie failed to show that his double jeopardy rights were violated when
he was charged with multiple counts of possession of sexually exploitative material
where he possessed multiple images of sexually exploitative material in multiple media
depicting multiple victims, all housed on a single thumb drive?
3.
Has Gillespie failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing and executing a sentence of ten years with two years fixed in Docket No.
39426 upon revoking his withheld judgment and probation?
4.

Has Gillespie failed to establish an abuse of the court's sentencing discretion?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Gillespie Has Failed To Establish Error In The District Court's Determination That
Images Of Sexually Exploitative Material Housed On A Thumb Drive Were
Encompassed Within The Definitions Of Idaho Code§ 18-1507(2)(k)
A.

Introduction
Gillespie was convicted of two counts of possession of sexually exploitative

material under Idaho Code§ 18-1507A. (39427 R., pp.54-56.) On appeal, Gillespie
argues that his possession of sexually exploitative material was not encompassed
within the statute as it existed when he was charged because the images he possessed
were in digital format.

(Appellant's brief, pp.15-20.)

Gillespie's argument fails.

Gillespie's possession of child pornography falls squarely within the conduct prohibited
by Idaho Code § 18-1507A as it existed. His convictions should therefore be affirmed.

B.

Standard Of Review
The interpretation and construction of a statute present questions of law over

which the appellate court exercises free review. State v. Thompson, 140 Idaho 796,
798, 102 P.3d 1115, 1117 (2004); Statev. Dorn, 140 ldaho404, 405, 94 P.3d 709, 710
(Ct. App. 2004).

C.

Gillespie Violated Idaho Code§ 18-1507A As It Existed When He Was Charged
The objective of statutory interpretation is to give effect to legislative intent. State

v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 144, 233 P.3d 71, 75 (2010); Robison v. Bateman-HalL Inc.,
139 Idaho 207, 210, 76 P.3d 951, 954 (2003). Because "the best guide to legislative
intent" is the words of the statute, the interpretation of a statute must begin with the
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literal words of the statute.

State v. Doe, 147 Idaho 326, 328, 208 P.3d 730, 732

(2009). Where the statutory language is unambiguous, a court does not construe it but
simply follows the law as written. Mclean v. Maverik Country Stores, Inc., 142 Idaho
810, 813, 135 P.3d 756, 759 (2006). Thus, if the plain language of a statute is capable
of only one reasonable interpretation, it is the Court's duty to give the statute that
interpretation. Verska v. St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center, 151 Idaho 889, 896,
265 P.3d 502, 509 (2011) (disavowing cases with language that Court might not give
effect to unambiguous language of statute if such was "palpably absurd").
At the time of Gillespie's offenses, Idaho Code § 18-1507A prohibited the
possession of sexually exploitative material, as defined in Idaho Code § 18-1507, for
noncommercial purposes. Sexually exploitative material was defined as:
any photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, slide, or other
mechanically, electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material
which depicts a child engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used
for explicit sexual conduct.
l.C. § 18-1507(2)(k). Gillespie was charged with possessing a digital image of a minor
child engaged in sexual conduct and a digital video of a minor child engaged in sexual
conduct, both of which were contained on a thumb drive. (39427 R., pp.9-10.) Those
files on Gillespie's thumb drive did not originate on that thumb drive; they were
electronically reproduced onto the thumb drive.

Thus, they are "electronically ...

reproduced visual material which depicts a child engaged in, participating in, observing,
or being used for explicit sexual conduct." Gillespie was therefore guilty of possessing
sexually exploitative material in violation of Idaho Code§ 18-1507A.
On appeal, Gillespie argues that the images he possessed were digitally
reproduced material rather than electronically reproduced material. (Appellant's brief,
5

pp.15-20.) This is a distinction without a difference. When the images were transferred
from a hard drive to Gillespie's thumb drive, they were electronically reproduced.
Gillespie further argues that "radical changes were made" to the statutes that
criminalized the possession of sexually exploitative material, such that the definition of
sexually exploitative material was enlarged and the scope of prohibited conduct
expanded. (Appellant's brief, pp.18-19.) The amended version of Idaho Code § 181507 consolidates and clarifies the previous versions of Idaho Code §§ 18-1507 and 181507A.

As expressed by the legislature, and noted by Gillespie on appeal, "[t]he

purpose of this bill is to restructure the format of the child exploitation law to make it

easier to follow, update definitions to more closely match technological trends that exist
in today's society, and more clearly differentiate penalties based upon the severity of
the crime." (Appellant's brief, p.18, citing RS21245 (emphasis added).) The amended
statute restructures, clarifies, and updates the prior statutes; it does not, as Gillespie
claims, make sweeping alterations to the law regarding the scope of conduct prohibited.
Compare l.C. §§ 18-1507 (2006) and 18-1507A (2006) with l.C. § 18-1507 (2012).
Gillespie committed the acts that were prohibited by Idaho Code § 18-1507A.
Gillespie has failed to show otherwise.

11.
Gillespie Has Failed To Establish That His Double Jeopardy Rights Were Violated
A.

Introduction
On appeal, Gillespie argues that his multiple convictions for possession of

sexually exploitative material violates his right to be free from double jeopardy because
he only possessed a single thumb drive that contained multiple image files. (Appellant's
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brief, pp.26-33.)

Because Gillespie possessed multiple files of sexually exploitative

material in multiple media depicting multiple victims, there was no double jeopardy
violation.

B.

Standard Of Review
Whether a defendant's prosecution complies with the constitutional protection

against double jeopardy is a question of law subject to free review. State v. Santana,
135 Idaho 58, 63, 14 P.3d 378, 383 (Ct. App. 2000).

C.

Because Gillespie Committed Multiple Violations Of Idaho Code § 18-1507A,
Multiple Charges For Violating That Statute Did Not Constitute Double Jeopardy
The Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the United States

Constitution provides that no person shall "be subject for the same offense to be twice
put in jeopardy of life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. This clause affords a defendant
three basic protections: It protects against a second prosecution for the same offense
after acquittal; a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction; and multiple
criminal punishments for the same offense. Schiro v. Farley, 510 U.S. 222, 229 (1994);
State v. McKeeth, 136 Idaho 619, 622, 38 P.3d 1275, 1278 (Ct. App. 2001). However,
"offenses committed against multiple victims are not the same offense, for double
jeopardy purposes, even though they may arise from the same criminal episode." State
v. Alsanea, 138 Idaho 733, 744, 69 P.3d 153,164 (Ct. App. 2003); see also State v.
Major, 111 Idaho 410, 415 n.1, 725 P.2d 115, 120 n.1 (1986) (citing Wilkoff v. Superior
Court, 696 P.2d 134, 138 (Cal. 1985)).
The state charged Gillespie with multiple violations of Idaho Code § 18-1507A for
possessing "a digital image of a minor child engaging in sexual conduct" and for
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possessing "a digital video of minor child engaging in sexual conduct." (39427 R., pp.910.) Gillespie argues that these charges violate his double jeopardy rights because the
files depicting the sexually exploitative material were housed on a single thumb drive.
(Appellant's brief, pp.26-33.) Gillespie's argument that his double jeopardy rights were
violated relies on the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Major.

Gillespie's

reliance is misplaced. In Major, the Idaho Supreme Court held that charging multiple
counts of violating a statute is appropriate only where the actus reus prohibited by the
statute has been committed more than once.

~at

415, 725 P.2d at 120. In this case,

contrary to Gillespie's assertions, he committed the prohibited actus reus multiple times;
multiple charges were therefore appropriate.
The state concedes that the sexually exploitative images Gillespie possessed
were housed on a single thumb drive.

However, Idaho Code § 18-1507A did not

criminalize the possession of thumb drives. It criminalized the possession of "sexually
exploitative material as defined in Idaho Code § 18-1507." As noted above, sexually
exploitative material was defined as
any photograph, motion picture, videotape, print, negative, slide, or other
mechanically, electronically, or chemically reproduced visual material
which depicts a child engaged in, participating in, observing, or being used
for explicit sexual conduct.
l.C. § 18-1507(2)(k). Contained on Gillespie's thumb drive were myriad files of sexually
exploitative material. (Tr., p.169, Ls.16-19.) These files included an image of "a minor
child engaging in sexual conduct," which formed the basis for the charge in Count I, and
a separate video of a "9-12 year old girl removing her clothes and performing oral sex
on an adult male penis," which formed the basis for the charge in Count II. (39427 R.,
pp.9-10, 12-13.)

This is analogous to charging a defendant with one count for
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possessing a photograph depicting sexually exploitative material and a separate count
for possessing a separate video depicting sexually exploitative material. That Gillespie
had both items on a single thumb drive is no different than having both items in a single
briefcase. The statute criminalized possessing the images, not possessing the device
that housed them. See l.C. § 18-1507A. Gillespie, by possessing the multiple images
in multiple media, committed multiple violations of Idaho Code§ 18-1507A.
The Court previously addressed a similar argument in State v. Turney, 147 Idaho
690, 214 P.3d 1169 (Ct. App. 2009). In Turney, the defendant was charged with two
counts of aggravated DUI when he, while intoxicated, ran into a parked patrol vehicle,
severely injuring the two officers inside of it. Turney, 147 Idaho at 691, 214 P.3d at
1170. Turney argued that the state violated his double jeopardy rights by filing multiple
charges because, he asserted, the actus reus was his DUI. lQ.,_ at 691-92, 214 P.3d at
1170-71. The Court disagreed, holding that the actus reus, as defined by the statute,
was "causing great bodily harm, permanent disability, or permanent disfigurement to
any person." lQ.,_ at 692, 214 P.3d at 1171. Because Turney caused great bodily harm
to multiple victims, multiple charges were appropriate.

lQ.,_

Similar to the statute in

Turney, Idaho Code § 18-1507A criminalized the possession of any image that sexually
exploits minors.

Because Gillespie possessed multiple images depicting this type of

sexually exploitative material, he was properly charged with, and convicted of, multiple
counts of possession of sexually exploitative material.
Furthermore, the Court in Turney noted that the statute in that case was intended
to protect individual victims. Turney, 147 Idaho at 692, 214 P.3d at 1171. Similar to the
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statute in Turney, Idaho Code § 18-1507A was intended to protect individual victims. In
enacting the statute, the legislature explained:
It is the policy of the legislature in enacting this section to protect
children from the physical and psychological damage caused by their
being used in photographic representations of sexual conduct which
involves children. It is, therefore, the intent of the legislature to penalize
possession of photographic representations of sexual conduct which
involves children in order to protect the identity of children who are
victimized by involvement in the photographic representations, and to
protect children from future involvement in photographic representations of
sexual conduct.
l.C. § 18-1507A(1).

Because Gillespie's crimes implicated multiple victims, multiple

charges were appropriate, and he has failed to show that his double jeopardy rights
were violated.

II I.
Gillespie Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The District Court's Discretion In
Imposing And Executing A Sentence Of Ten Years With Two Years Fixed Upon
Revoking His Withheld Judgment And Probation
A.

Introduction
Gillespie argues that, in light of allegedly mitigating factors, the district court

abused its discretion when it imposed and executed a sentence of ten years with two
years fixed in Docket No. 39426 upon revoking his probation. (Appellant's brief, pp.3337.) Gillespie has failed to establish an abuse of discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Probation is a matter left to the sound discretion of the court." l.C. § 19-2601 (4).

The decision to revoke probation and execute the underlying sentence is reviewed for
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an abuse of discretion. State v. Sanchez, 149 Idaho 102, 105, 233 P.3d 33, 36 (2009)
(citing State v. Lafferty, 125 Idaho 378, 381, 870 P.2d 1337, 1340 (Ct. App. 1994)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion When It Imposed And Executed A
Sentence Of Ten Years With Two Fixed Upon Revoking Gillespie's Probation
In reviewing a district court's decision to revoke probation, this Court employs a

two-step analysis. Sanchez, 149 Idaho at 105, 233 P.3d at 36 (citation omitted). First,
the Court considers whether the defendant actually violated his probation.

!st.

"If it is

determined that the defendant has in fact violated the terms of his probation, the second
question is what should be the consequences of that violation."

!st.

A district court's

decision to revoke probation and execute a sentence is a discretionary one that will not
be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of that discretion.

!st.

On appeal, Gillespie does not argue that the district court abused its discretion by
revoking his probation. Instead, he argues that the district court abused its discretion by
imposing and executing a sentence of ten years with two years fixed upon revoking
probation.

(Appellant's brief, pp.33-37.)

None of Gillespie's arguments establish an

abuse of the district court's discretion in this case.
Initially, the state charged Gillespie with possessing sexually exploitative material
for other than commercial purposes. (39426 R., pp.92-93.) Pursuant to an agreement,
Gillespie pleaded guilty to the possession of sexually exploitative material. (39426 R.,
pp.105-08; Tr., p.13, Ls.8-12.) The district court gave Gillespie the opportunity of a
withheld judgment and placed him on probation for five years. (39426 R., pp.129-32.)
Among the terms of his probation, Gillespie was required to truthfully submit to regular
polygraph examinations, was not allowed to view or possess sexually explicit materials,
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and was not allowed to develop relationships with individuals that were currently on
community supervision or that were engaged in illegal behavior.

(See 39426 R.,

pp.130-31.) Gillespie was not a successful probationer.
Gillespie violated the rules of his probation several times. A few months after
being placed on probation, he admitted viewing pornography during a polygraph
examination and was incarcerated for seven days.

(39426 R., pp.140-41.)

A few

months later, he admitted that he was viewing R rated movies with sexual content after
being told that he had to remove all R rated videos from his home and could not view
them, and he was deceptive on a polygraph exam. (39426 R., pp.144-45.) On these
violations, Gillespie was incarcerated for 14 days.

(39426 R., p.146.)

Gillespie

continued to violate his probation, admitting that he viewed pornography and engaged
in a prohibited sexual relationship with another probationer.
163.)

(39426 R., pp.151-52,

Gillespie's conduct also resulted in a separate criminal prosecution for

possession of sexually exploitative material. (39427 R., pp.9-10.) Ultimately, the state
filed a probation violation and the district court revoked Gillespie's probation and
entered a judgment of conviction, imposing and executing a unified sentence of ten
years with two years fixed. (39426 R., pp.151-52, 179-80.)
On appeal, Gillespie argues that the district court's sentence of ten years with
two years fixed is excessive in light of Gillespie's history of victimization. (Appellant's
brief, pp.34-37.)

At sentencing, the district court recognized the severity of the

victimization Gillespie suffered as a youth. (Tr., p.295, L.9 - p.296, L.9.) However, it
also recognized that, as an adult, Gillespie had chosen to succumb to his deviant sexual
desires. (Tr., p.296, L.17 - p.297, L.2.) His failures on probation, and the lengths to
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which he went in order to hide his continuing criminal conduct, demonstrated that he
presented a risk to the community. (Tr., p.298, L.10 - p.300, L.7.)
As noted by the district court in its order denying Gillespie's subsequently filed
Rule 35 motion:
Gillespie's possession of sexually exploitive [sic] material is a
serious one, but Gillespie's actions show he has not taken his original
conviction seriously. Gillespie was given an opportunity to avoid criminal
conviction and to change his conduct.
Despite receiving leniency,
Gillespie violated the terms of his probation by viewing pornography and
having sexual relations with another probationer, then incurred new
charges for the same conduct.
In order to protect society from Gillespie's apparent inability to
control his criminal conduct, incarceration is necessary. In November of
2009, Gillespie served seven (7) days discretionary jail time in November
of 2009 [sic] for viewing pornography and accessing internet chat rooms.
This shock treatment failed to gain Gillespie's attention. Gillespie's
unwillingness to abide by the rules of his probation, and his failure to learn
from discretionary incarceration lead [sic] to the imposition of judgment
and to his sentence.
(39426 R., pp.197-98.)

For the reasons articulated by the district court, Gillespie's

sentence is reasonable.

Gillespie has failed to show an abuse of the district court's

discretion.

IV.
Gillespie Has Failed To Establish An Abuse Of The Court's Sentencing Discretion
A.

Introduction
Gillespie argues that the district court abused its discretion by imposing

consecutive sentences of ten years with three years fixed on each of his convictions for
possession of sexually exploitative materials in Docket No. 39427, and by running those
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sentences consecutive to his sentence of ten years with two years fixed in Docket No.
39426. (Appellant's brief, pp.38-40.) Gillespie has failed to establish an abuse of the
district court's sentencing discretion.

B.

Standard Of Review
"Sentencing decisions are reviewed for an abuse of discretion." State v. Moore,

131 Idaho 814, 823, 965 P.2d 174, 183 (1998) (citing State v. Wersland, 125 Idaho 499,
873 P.2d 144 (1994)).

C.

The District Court Did Not Abuse Its Sentencing Discretion When It Imposed
Consecutive Sentences Of Ten Years With Three Years Fixed, Ten Years With
Three Years Fixed, And Ten Years With Two Years Fixed On Gillespie's Multiple
Convictions For Possession Of Sexually Exploitative Materials
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, an appellant is required to establish

that the sentence is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 576, 577, 38
P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 P.3d 27 (2000)). To
carry his burden, Gillespie must show that the sentence is excessive under any
reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is
reasonable if appropriate to achieve the primary objective of protecting society, and any
or all of the related sentencing goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384, 582 P.2d 728, 730 (1978). The Court reviews the whole
sentence on appeal, with the presumption that the fixed portion of the sentence will be
the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170
P.3d 387, 391 (2007). In deference to the trial judge, the Court will not substitute its
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view of a reasonable sentence where reasonable minds might differ. State v. Toohill,
103 Idaho 565, 568, 650 P.2d 707, 710 (Ct. App. 1982).
Considering the nature of Gillespie's crimes and his character, his consecutive
sentences of ten years with three years fixed, ten years with three years fixed, and ten
years with two years fixed are not excessive. Gillespie is a repeat offender, both with
theft crimes and with possession of sexually exploitative materials. (PSI, p.66.) In fact,
not only is Gillespie a repeat offender, in the case of possessing sexually exploitative
materials, he committed his repeat offenses while on probation for the initial offense.
(Compare 39426 R., p.129 (five year probation commenced April 9, 2009) with 39427
R., pp.9-10 (new crimes occurred on or about February 16, 2011 ).) The district court

considered the mitigating evidence referenced by Gillespie in this case, but concluded
that despite the victimization Gillespie suffered as a child, as an adult he chose to
succumb to his own sexually deviant desires. (Tr., p.295, L.9 - p.297, L.2.) The district
court also considered Gillespie's behavior during probation, where he went to great
lengths to hide his crimes by purchasing computers and then disposing of them after
using them to view sexually exploitative materials, and it considered the demonstrated
risk Gillespie posed to the community, as concluded in his psychosexual evaluation.
(Tr., p.297, L.7 - p.300, L.7.) Ultimately, recognizing that protecting the community was
its highest obligation, the district court imposed sentences that best served that
objective. (Tr., p.300, L.8 - p.301, L.6.)
On appeal, Gillespie argues that the district court's decision to run the sentences
consecutively instead of concurrently also represents a special abuse of discretion in
this case. (Appellant's brief, pp.39-40.) First, as noted above, this Court begins with
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the presumption that Gillespie will serve the fixed portion of his sentences in
confinement with the indeterminate portion being served on parole.

See Oliver, 144

Idaho at 726, 170 P.3d at 391. That would place Gillespie in custody for eight years,
with the additional 22 years served while on parole. When initially given the opportunity
of a withheld judgment and probation, Gillespie repeatedly violated the terms of his
probation, including committing the crime again. (See 39426 R., pp.140, 144-45, 15152; 39427 R., pp.9-10.) Requiring Gillespie to serve eight years in confinement under
these circumstances, where he is a repeat offender and has demonstrated that he
presents a continuing risk to the community when not confined, is not unreasonable.
Giving Gillespie a long tail also provides some deterrent effect, both to him and others,
and may promote Gillespie's ultimate rehabilitation as parole supervision will provide a
framework for accountability.
Gillespie has failed to show that the district court's sentences are excessive. The
district court's sentences protect society from a repeat offender, offer some deterrence,
and may also promote rehabilitation.

The district court's sentences are therefore

reasonable and should be affirmed.

16

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm Gillespie's convictions and
sentences for possession of sexually exploitative material, and the district court's order
revoking Gillespie's probation and entering a judgment of conviction.

DATED this 23rd day of January, 2013.
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